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French economist Thomas Piketty’s bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-
First Century, provocatively claims that the widening income inequalities in
the advanced economies (indeed, widening income inequality worldwide), is
fundamentally rooted in the exigencies of the capitalist system. Specifically,
capitalism operates according to inexorable laws – in Piketty’s succinct
formulation as r>g. That is, “r” is the rate of return on capital whereas “g” is
the rate of economic growth. However, “the central contradiction of
capitalism” is that the rate of return on capital (r) will always exceed the rate
of economic growth (g). Because the rate of return on capital is higher than
the economy’s overall rate of growth, widening income inequality is inherent
to capitalism.
Drawing on Marx’s insight that the returns on capital (which to Piketty is
mainly wealth in the form of financial assets and equity) tend to be far greater
than the growth rate of the economy, Piketty concludes that the owners of
equity will always see their wealth grow much faster than those depended
on earning income from labour (Table 1). And, since capital tends to be
concentrated in fewer hands while income generated from labour is more
broadly dispersed, it is hardly surprising that the capital-owning class have
seen their incomes and overall wealth grow at an exponential rate, whereas
those who sell their labour for a living have seen their incomes either stagnate
or decline in real purchasing terms.
Moreover, Piketty notes that inequality in income and wealth are not
only transmitted over time, they also worsen over time. Drawing on an
enormous volume of comparative data, Piketty shows that although advanced
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Table 1: After-tax Rate of Return vs. Growth Rate at the World Level
Source: Piketty (2014, appendix)
economies have grown at a rate of one to 1.5 per cent per year, the average
return on capital has been between four to five per cent a year. He argues that
the sharp rise in income inequality in the OECD economies, in particular,
in the United States and the United Kingdom, has been driven mainly by
steep increases in “wage inequality,” and warns that the trend towards slower
growth in the advanced economies in years ahead will make inequalities in
income and wealth even more pronounced. In fact, Piketty predicts a sustained
increase in inequality, because as he argues, the distribution of wealth is mainly
the outcome of the after-tax rate of return on capital minus the growth rate of
GDP (i.e. r – g). Since wealth grows along with the after-tax return on capital
(r), while wages grow along with GDP growth (g), and because wealth will
inevitably become more important than earned income, inequality will also
sharply increase.
However, if widening income and wealth inequality is endemic to
capitalism, what then, explains capitalisms’ remarkable stability during
the six decades between 1914 and 1973 – the so-called “golden age” of
capitalism – which according to Piketty is the only period in recorded history
to experience a huge “leveling” when both the total wealth relative to income
and wealth and income inequality actually declined and prosperity and living
standards improved across the board in the advanced capitalist economies?
Piketty claims that this period which saw the rate of economic growth exceed
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the after tax rate of return on capital was an aberration – the result of the
massive human and capital stock destruction due to the two World Wars
(including the imposition of higher taxes on high incomes to finance the wars),
which flattened income and wealth inequality, the establishment of an
expansive “social state” following WWII (which imposed confiscatory taxation
on high incomes, including high inheritance tax rates and state intervention
to regulate capital and redistribute wealth), and the success of a mobilised
and empowered labour movement in the advanced capitalist economies to
garner concessions from the owners of capital.
However, as Piketty notes, this did not mean that capitalism as a system
had been “tamed” or reformed. On the contrary, the irrevocable laws of
capitalism have remained fundamentally unaltered (that is, r always
exceeds g), returning with a vengeance to its normal trajectory by the late
1970s under Reagan and Thatcher’s pro-capital neoliberal agenda. Over time,
Piketty argues, neoliberal policies systematically gutted the “social state” and
facilitated the re-emergence of a system marked by even greater disparity
between capital and labour with the wealthy capital owning class deriving an
even larger share of their income and wealth through finance capital. Combined
with the sharp reduction in the top earners marginal tax rates (with the average
rate in the OECD falling from 66 per cent in 1981 to 43 per cent in 2013),
including the reduction in the average statutory corporate income tax rate,
the globalisation of capital or “financialisation,” and the emasculation of
organised labour in order to keep down minimum wages, but with no limits
placed on the incomes earned by the wealthy and their heirs, has not only
further exacerbated inequalities, but ushered in “patrimonial capitalism”
reminiscent of the pre-WWI period when wealth derived from income and
inheritance dominated.
Just as it was for his hero Marx, to Piketty also, the capitalist system
characterised by impersonal, hierarchical and exploitative market relations is
the principal determinant of socio-economic inequalities. Unlike the Nobel
prize-winning economists, Paul Krugman who in his The Conscience of a
Liberal (2007) and Joseph Stiglitz in The Price of Inequality (2012) blame
“market imper-fections” for the widening wealth and income inequality,
Piketty argues that the rise in inequality “… has nothing to do with any market
imperfection: the more perfect the capital market (in the economist’s sense),
the more likely r is to be greater than g.” (p. 24). In other words, the higher
the ratio, the wider the inequality. Similarly, Piketty concludes that over the
long-term even the well-intentioned reformist and redistributionist policies
of liberal democracies will fail to meaningfully reduce income inequality.
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Although the pivotal role market forces play in creating and distributing
wealth, and shaping the fortunes of nations is undeniable, the dangers of
single-minded focus on economic factors to explain such complex processes
are also well-known. Clearly, Piketty is cognizant of this as he notes that
“one should be wary of any economic determinism in regard to inequalities
of income and wealth. The history of the distribution of wealth has always
been deeply political, and cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms”
(p. 20). Yet, Piketty’s account remains incorrigibly economistic – the political
underpinnings of rising inequality conspicuously absent. In fact, the closest
Piketty comes to addressing the issue is to rhetorically ask: “Has the US
political process been captured by the 1 per cent? This idea has become
increasingly popular among observers of the Washington political scene”
(p. 513).
By focusing almost exclusively on economic explanations Piketty
presents a rather rigid and one-sided picture of, both, the sources and extent
of income disparities, its socioeconomic and political implications, and how
best to address this problem. Yet, politics is central to understanding the
patterns of economic growth and redistribution – especially in the mature
democracies whose commitment to economic justice and redistribution is a
raison d’etre of the liberal democratic welfare states. Hence, it is appropriate
to ask why these democracies – if Piketty is correct – have failed to mitigate
the widening income inequality by implementing policies to reduce the gap
between r and g, including a progressive taxation system (something Piketty
advocates) that imposes much higher taxes on top incomes, and transfer
and redistributive policies and programs to uplift the have-nots?
Furthermore, can these democracies reverse the seeming rise of a “new
Glided Age” marked by widening income inequalities and decreasing
socioeconomic mobility? Fortunately, the following studies reviewed here
by “bring politics in” shed much light on these questions, besides providing
a much-needed nuance (and corrective) to Piketty’s unduly deterministic
explanations.
The Nature of Inequality
It is important to reiterate that economic inequality is relative: even as
inequality has increased worldwide, the absolute level of economic well-being
has also improved globally since the onset of the Industrial Revolution.
This is because even if the top 10, the top one or the top 0.1 per cent of the
population enjoy a disproportionately bigger share of the economic pie, the
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size of pie has also rapidly grown enabling even the bottom or poorest
percentile of the population to improve their overall economic well-being.
Tyler Cowen (2011) lucidly captures this irony:
“the inequality of personal well-being is sharply down over the past
hundred years and perhaps over the past twenty years as well. Bill Gates
is much, much richer than I am, yet it is not obvious that he is much
happier if, indeed, he is happier at all. I have access to penicillin, air
travel, good cheap food, the Internet and virtually all of the technical
innovations that Gates does. Like the vast majority of Americans, I have
access to some important new pharmaceuticals, such as statins to
protect against heart disease. To be sure, Gates receives the very best
care from the world’s top doctors, but our health outcomes are in the
same ballpark. I don’t have a private jet or take luxury vacations, and —
I think it is fair to say — my house is much smaller than his. I can’t meet
with the world’s elite on demand. Still, by broad historical standards,
what I share with Bill Gates is far more significant than what I don’t
share with him.”
Second, the extent of the measurable income-gap varies, sometimes
significantly, from country to country, and the levels of economic polarisation
depend on what evidence one looks at and how one interprets the data. As
Mankiw (2013) has pointed out, inequality is not a problem, and “absolute
poverty” is largely a problem for the developing world. Nevertheless, there is
no denying that socioeconomic inequalities, especially income inequality has
increased to alarming levels in many countries, and Piketty is certainly correct
in pointing out that among advanced democracies, the United States stands
out for its high levels of income inequality. According to the Congressional
Budget Office (2011), between 1979 and 2007, the after-tax income for the
top one per cent of households grew by 275 per cent; 65 per cent for the
highest 20 per cent of households; just under 40 per cent for the next 60 per
cent, and only about 18 per cent for the bottom 20 per cent of households
(Tables 2 and 3). In other words, the top 20 per cent of American households
experienced much faster income growth than the bottom 80 per cent over a
period of three decades. As the then chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, Alan Krueger (2012), has aptly noted, “We were growing together
for the first three decades after World War II, but for the last three decades we
have been growing apart.”
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Source: Congressional Budget Office
Table 2: US Real Average After-tax Income
Table 3: Countries with the Highest Income Inequality
Rank Country per cent of Wealth Held by
Richest 10 per cent
1. Russia 84.8
2. Turkey 77.7
3. Hong Kong 77.5
4. Indonesia 77.2
5. Philippines 76
6. Thailand 75
7. US 74.6
8. India 74
9. Egypt 73.3
10. Brazil 73.3
Source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report (October 2014), https://publi-cations.credit-
suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=60931FDE-A2D2-F568-B041B58C5EA591A4 (ac-
cessed 10 March 2015)
Nevertheless, Piketty’s explanations regarding why income inequality
has sharply increased in the United States and other OECD countries needs
to be qualified. The reasons for this are complex and interrelated: Perhaps,
the single major factor has to do with the fact that wage gains have become
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highly unequal, with the top 10 per cent experiencing the biggest increases.
This is largely because the rise of a powerful financial sector and their CEO’s
ability to generate unprecedented increases in value has sharply driven-up
wage inequality between the top percentage of income earners and everyone
else. On the other hand, the nominal minimum wage has not increased in line
with inflation. On the contrary, the real minimum wage has decreased in most
OECD countries, including the United States negatively impacting the income
and wealth of the lower middle and working class workers.1 Exacerbating
this, globalisation and rapid technological change, in particular, outsourcing
and offshoring has “hollowed out” the share of skilled jobs worsening the
stagnation of middle class incomes (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). In the United
States, the increased labour-market competition due to the huge influx of
immigration (in particular, illegal) has put tremendous downward pressure
on wages for low-skilled workers, even as this has helped to greatly reduce
the cost of living for those above the middle percentile of income distribution.
Piketty also underestimates how the Great Recession of 2007-09 and the
resultant wealth destruction, including the painfully slow recovery and high
unemployment, has made income inequality far worse than it actually was
before the recession. Similarly, Piketty’s claim that the level of income
distribution in the United States is the “most unequal” among advanced
industrial economies is misleading as it is based on a rather selective reading
of the data. As is wellknown, income can be measured in two ways: market
income before taxes and transfer payments, and disposable income after taxes
and transfer payments. As the data from the non-partisan Congressional Budget
Office shows, inequality of market income before taxes and transfer payments
in the United States is actually slightly below most OECD countries, including
the cradle-to-grave social-welfare states like Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
In fact, Germany has higher income inequality before taxes and transfers
than the United States.
Moreover, Piketty’s charge that compared to other advanced economies,
the American taxation system is the “least progressive” because the distribution
of disposable income after taxes and transfer payments is the most unequal in
the United States, needs to be qualified. First, the issue has little to do with
which country has the most progressive tax code. Arguably, the American tax
system is not very different from its OECD counterparts. The anomaly has to
do with the fact that unlike most OECD countries, the United States does not
use “consumption taxes” such as the VAT (value-added taxes) to collect
revenue. Of course, this does not mean that the VAT is progressive. The claim
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by supporters that VAT is progressive because the increases in generated
revenue are used to fund welfare services and transfer programs and this has
helped to keep inequality is check may be true in theory. However, in practice,
the VAT can be just as regressive as lower-income households spend a much
higher percentage of their incomes on consumption, not to mention it
discourages businesses to invest and create jobs. Second, in the United States,
the ‘Earned Income Tax Credit’ helps to offset the federal income and payroll
taxes of workers who earn below certain income levels. About 80 per cent of
the tax credit goes to workers in the bottom 40 per cent of the income
distribution. Complementing this is the Child Tax Credit which reduces taxes
of up to 1000 dollars for each dependent child under the age of 17. In fact, an
estimated 40 per cent of low-income US households do not pay any federal
income tax.
Contrary to Piketty and the popular narrative, only a minority of the so-
called “one-per centers” in the United States are products of the perverse
compensation schemes on Wall Street. Rather, three factors are largely
responsible for the widening income inequality between the so-called one
per cent and the rest. First is the growing trend towards “assortative mating”
– where individuals tend to marry others with the same educational
background. Put bluntly, the better educated marrying each other not only
skews the distribution of household incomes in their favour, they are able to
pass down their advantages to their off-springs (Greenwood 2014). The second
is the result of dramatic changes in family structure (such as the number of
one-parent versus two-parent households), and third, significant numbers of
the new rich and the growing affluent are both creators and products of the
new economy. The vast majority is made-up of the highly-educated and skilled
professionals, including sport and entertainment super-stars. As Zingales
(2009, 25) points out, “even before the internet boom created many young
billionaires, in 1996, one in four billionaires in the United States could
be described as self-made…. And the wealthiest self-made American
billionaires – from Bill Gates and Michael Dell to Warren Buffet and Mark
Zucker-berg – have made their fortunes in competitive businesses, with little
or no government interference or help.”2
Given this, Piketty’s claim that intergenerational income mobility is lower
in the United States than in most other advanced economies because the US
has higher levels of income inequality needs to be qualified. No doubt, there
is a striking correlation between the levels of inequality across countries
and rates of intergenerational mobility, and legitimate concern that rising
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inequality is creating the so-called ‘Great Gatsby curve’ by reducing
intergenerational mobility. Indeed, the Great Gatsby curve does show that
countries experiencing high inequality in one generation tend to experience
lower intergenerational mobility in the next generation (Corak 2013).
Nevertheless, evidence also indicates that there is strong cross-country
relationship between intergenerational mobility and inequality in skills. That
is, wide skill gaps seem to be behind both higher inequality and lower
intergenerational mobility. Given the strong correlation between intergene-
rational mobility and access to good education and stable family structure,
the exploding cost of higher education and erosion of the family structure is
a huge constraint to upward mobility in the United States.3
The Politics of Inequality
In their seminal formulation in political economy, Meltzer and Richard
(1981), point out that high levels of inequality in a democracy should
ultimately force the political elites to acquiesce to the “median voter” (or the
voter at the median of the income distribution), to support higher levels of
taxes on the wealthy and greater redistribution of income. Similarly, according
to Stigler (1970) since democracy tends to transfer political power to the
middle classes, rather than the poor, redistribution of wealth can only take
place if the middle class favour such redistribution. However, Francis
Fukuyama (2011) has described the emerging political order in the United
States as a “plutocracy,” or one based on the “rule by the rich and for the
rich…a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way
so as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense
of others.” To Fukuyama, market forces alone are not responsible for the
widening economic divide in the United States and elsewhere.4
Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2010) in their Winner-Take-All Politics:
How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Turned Its Back on the Middle
Class, reject conventional economic explanations (globalisation, technological
changes or educational levels) as the root cause of growing inequalities. Rather,
they provocatively argue that the fundamental cause for rising inequality in
the United States is “Washington” because the American government has been
highjacked by powerful business and financial lobbyists to safeguard and
serve the interests of the wealthy at the expense of the middle and lower
classes – who have been systematically economically disenfranchised. This
transformation in American politics began in the late 1970s under a Democratic
president and a Democratic Congress whose support for big-business interests
led to the implementation of government policies that systematically weakened
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regulations that protected labour, the replacement of progressive tax policies
(that had helped ensure a fairer distribution of income and wealth), and
repeated tax cuts for the rich. The pro-business agenda continued under
Reagan, Bush 1, Clinton and Bush 2 and Obama as the powerful business and
financial lobbyists fund both Democrat and Republican politicians to safeguard
and advance their interests. Pierson and Hacker underscore that income
inequality in contemporary America fundamentally means that only a very
tiny segment of the population (less than one per cent), have made the real
economic gains. Specifically, the “have-it-alls” or the top one per cent of
households captured some 40 per cent of the nation’s GDP growth since 1979,
while the rest of the populace have barely seen their incomes grow in the last
30 years. The “winner-take-all economy” has benefitted the rich at the expense
of everyone because Democratic and Republican politicians and big business
interests worked in tandem to undermine and gut the regulations and
progressive tax policies that had earlier helped to provide a more fair economic
distribution across all income groups. The end result is “winner-take-all gains”
with a small minority benefitting, but a broad increase in inequality across
income distributions, including marked decline in economic security for the
vast majority.
As the subtitle of Nicholas Carnes (2013), White Collar Government:
The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy-Making vividly states, the
socioeconomic or “class” background of legislators profoundly influences
and determines the content of policies the US political system generates.
Specifically, Carnes argues that individuals from blue-collar or working class
backgrounds are woefully underrepresented in the American political system,
while the overwhelming dominance of the white-collar or upper-classes in
America’s legislatures gives the wealthy unprecedented political influence,
in particular, allowing them to skew policy that protects and advances elite
economic interests. He notes that out of the 783 members of Congress (who
served between 1999 and 2008) only 13 had spent about a quarter of their
prior careers engaged in blue-collar occupations, namely factory and retail.
The overwhelming majority came from white-collar backgrounds, in
particular, law and business.
To Carnes, a Congress member’s socio-economic or class backgrounds
matter a great deal because class fundamentally shapes legislators’ views on
a host of important public policy issues such as taxation, corporate rights,
labour, unemployment, welfare, anti-poverty policies and programs, health,
education, including the very role of government itself. However, even after
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controlling for differences in party affiliation, constituencies, campaign
contributions, and changing demographic patterns, Carnes finds that legislators
who have blue-collar or working-class roots are far more liberal on economic
issues – in both their individual voting records and favourable attitudes towards
working class concerns. Carnes notes that since individuals who come from
working class backgrounds or have held blue-collar occupations are
conspicuously underrepresented in Congress, working class voices are rarely
heard – and that this neglect has only served to exacerbate income inequality.
As he notes, “Policy makers from the working class bring a unique voice to
the… legislative process, but in our white-collar government, they must shout
to accomplish what other politicians can do with a whisper” (pp. 60–61).
Carnes concludes that if Congress’s class composition was truly representative
of the country as a whole, its policies would be more pro-labour and less pro-
Wall Street. Specifically, Carnes conducts a simulation exercise on roll-call
votes in Congress to find out how the last few Congresses would have voted
on several key economic issues if it truly reflected the country’s actual class
makeup. He notes that a number of business-friendly policies, including the
Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 and the financial bailout following the
subprime crisis would have failed to pass. Even at the state and local levels
(which has more variation among legislator backgrounds), a 10 percentage
point increase in the per cent of working-class legislators would translate
into a four to five percentage point increase in the share of budget expenditures
earmarked for redistributive and welfare programs – even after controlling
for the available resources, partisan divide, racial composition and union
density.
Martin Gilens (2012), Affluence and Influence, succinctly examines the
relationship between public policy and public preferences to see if political
influence and power has become more concentrated in the hands of the wealthy
in the United States. To assess if mass or popular policy preferences were
actually enacted into law, Gilens reviews almost 2,000 survey questions
conducted by different national polls between 1964 and 2006.5 He concludes
that “under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the
government does or doesn’t adopt” (p. 1). Rather, the evidence shows that
“higher-income respondents’ views are more strongly related to government
policy,” and that “the strength of the relationship between preferences and
policy outcomes not only increases with each step up the income ladder but
does so at an increasing rate” (pp. 76–77). Furthermore, the preferences of
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the majority or those in the middle and bottom income levels tend to translate
into tangible outcomes when they happen to coincide with the preferences of
influential interest groups (such as the protection of Social Security by the
AARP), or the wealthy such as the expansion of Medicare under President
George W. Bush with strong backing of the pharmaceutical industry.6
However, “when preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge,
government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support
or opposition among the poor” (p. 81). Similarly, “median-income Americans
fare no better than the poor when their preferences diverge from those of the
well-off…when their views differ from those of more affluent Americans,
government policy appears to be fairly responsive to the well-off and virtually
unrelated to the desires of low and middle-income citizens” (p. 81). Gilens
concludes that if 80 per cent of voters at the 90th income percentile support a
change, it has a 50 per cent chance of passing, versus a 32 per cent chance
when supported by 80 per cent of voters at the 10th income percentile. Gilens
also finds that despite the Democrats proclaimed claim as champions of the
underclass, the Democrats are only slightly better at representing the interests
of blue-collar and low-income constituencies than Republicans. Rather, the
seemingly irreconcilable partisan considerations notwithstanding, both parties
are far more responsive to the preferences of campaign contributors, interest
groups and wealthy members in their constituencies. To Gilens, this mismatch
between policy preferences and actual policy outcomes lies at the root of the
widening inequality in the United States.
Schlozman, Verba and Brady’s (2012), The Unheavenly Chorus
authoritatively underscores the findings of Gilens. The authors draw on a
voluminous compendium of some five decades of public opinion data to
measure citizen political participation, (or what they call “voice”) across
groups with different “socio-economic status” (SES). By combining income
and education levels into an index of SES, the authors show that high SES
individuals tend to be conservative on economic matters and that their voices
dominate economic policy making in the United States. Not surprisingly, the
authors conclude that “those who are not affluent and well educated are less
likely to take part politically and are even less likely to be represented by the
activity of organised interests.” (p. 5). Specifically, the voices of lower-income
groups are rarely heard not only because of their very limited participation in
the political system either as voters or volunteers for campaigns, but because
the vast majority, either by choice or design, have become excluded from the
system (as many are not registered voters), as they lack the resources for
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campaign contributors or have lobbyists and interest groups to promote their
interests. Indeed, the authors argue that the Supreme Court, including some
other federal courts in deregulating campaign finance has only served to further
muzzle the voices of the less privileged.
Of course, the claim that the voices of the privileged and well-educated
are over-represented in American politics is hardly new – indeed, the book’s
subtitle acknowledges E.E. Schattschneider’s (1960) famous observation that
the “flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a
strong upper-class accent.” However, what the authors convincingly show is
that economic inequality significantly contributes to inequality in the citizenry
involvement in politics and that unequal voices have become deeply
institutionalised in the United States – noting that “Our analysis of the roots
of political inequalities makes clear how deeply embedded they are in social,
educational, and economic inequalities” (p. 539). As in Gilens study, the
authors’ research also raises questions regarding the long-established norm
in political science: Why politicians in the United States have generally ignored
the “median voter.” After all, classic political models show that the preferences
of median voters tends to be more moderate and representative, and politicians
gravitate to the middle in a two-party system because one ignores the median
voter at their peril. The authors persuasively show that those active in politics
(both Republicans and Democrats) have higher incomes than the median voter
and generally share similar economic preferences. Hence, “there is no income
confiscation in America. Political aspirants seeking the political support needed
to be nominated by their parties and to run an effective campaign will be
drawn away from the median voter, with clear consequences for policy
outcomes” (p. 261).
Conclusion
In a vibrant representative democracy, all citizens (despite their economic
standing) have their voices heard over the policies and programs their elected
officials adopt. However, when the voices of the majority are marginalised
and when influence and political power becomes disproportionately
concentrated, democracy is threatened. Clearly, as the preceding pages have
shown, the growing income inequality is pushing that ideal aside and that
there is good reason to be worried about the current trajectory of American
democracy. Yet, there is room for optimism. Democracies not only have the
ability to correct course, we also know that key to reforming the current
political order is to reduce the influence of money in politics. When the
privileged and affluent learn that they cannot buy influence and access, policy
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can gradually shift line with the preferences of all citizens. Meaningful
campaign finance reforms, replacing gerrymandering with competitive
districting and registering voters is essential if we are ever to have a democracy
that respects the aspirations and preferences of all its citizens.
Notes
1. Since for most American households wages make up the primary source of disposable
income, the slow growth in disposable income have led many middle and lower
income households to turn to debt to finance their consumption. The unsustainability
of this was starkly revealed during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
2. A cursory look shows that individuals who were on the original “Forbes 400” list of
richest Americans in 1982 were not on the list in 2013. They were replaced by new
names.
3. Mettler (2014) has compellingly argued that the US education system has changed
“from one that provides access and opportunity to one that widens economic inequality
and fosters social division.”
4. In a recent paper Bonica, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2013, 1), ask why “During
the past two generations, democratic forms have coexisted with massive increases in
economic inequality in the United States and many other advanced democracies.
Moreover, these new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 per cent and
even the top .01 per cent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality
could be held in check by political equality in the form of “one person, one vote.”
The authors provide “five possible reasons why the US political system has failed to
counterbalance rising inequality. First, both Republicans and many Democrats have
experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a form of free market capitalism
that offers less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax
rates for those with high incomes, and deregulation of a number of industries. Second,
immigration and low turnout of the poor have combined to make the distribution of
voters more weighted to high incomes than is the distribution of households. Third,
rising real income and wealth has made a larger fraction of the population less attracted
to turning to government for social insurance. Fourth, the rich have been able to use
their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through
campaign contributions, lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and
bureaucrats. Fifth, the political process is distorted by institutions that reduce the
accountability of elected officials to the majority and hampered by institutions that
combine with political polarisation to create policy gridlock.”
5. The bulk of the data are drawn from polls conducted between 1981 and 2002, with
supplementary data from polls conducted between 1964 to 1969 and 2005 to 2006.
6. Gilens notes that the preferences of poor and middle-class Americans have a higher
chance to be enacted into law (albeit, much watered-down versions), during the run-
up to presidential, but not congressional elections. However, during periods of
gridlock, Congress tends to be more responsive to popular preferences.
